Operation Iraqi Freedom planning mistakes? Part 1

Tom Maquire briefly discusses a NY Times article about the "mistakes" that were made in the planning for the aftermath of the Iraqi war. Personally I would prefer to wait for some time to pass before making judgments about "mistakes" in an ongoing operation. Furthermore I'm no policy wonk, so I tend to let others address issues like this and then make judgments about their judgments.

However (you knew this was coming) the liberals and their adoring media insist on pointing out the "mistakes" that have been made (as well as demanding that the President "admit" to them), so the subject must be addressed.

There are several points that must be understood when it comes to planning operations regardless of scale. First, there will be disagreements. It's simply impossible to get competent, educated people to agree on every detail of any intricate plan. Second, plans seldom work out precisely as detailed. There are always unexpected problems that must be dealt with as they arise. Finally, if something "major" goes wrong with a plan, it may not be possible to adjust. It may require an entirely new plan.

Having said that, let's examine the writers' complaints about the Iraqi war and its aftermath.

Huddling in a drawing room with his top commanders, General Franks told them it was time to make plans to leave. Combat forces should be prepared to start pulling out within 60 days if all went as expected, he said. By September, the more than 140,000 troops in Iraq could be down to little more than a division, about 30,000 troops.

To help bring stability and allow the Americans to exit, President Bush had reviewed a plan the day before seeking four foreign divisions - including Arab and NATO troops - to take on peacekeeping duties.

As the Baghdad meeting drew to a close, the president in a teleconference congratulated the commanders on a job well done. Afterward, they posed for photos and puffed on victory cigars.

So the plan that was in place was that, after the major combat was over, four divisions (approx. 120,000 troops) consisting of "foreign", NATO and Arab troops would assume peacekeeping duties.

Only two of those divisions ever appeared - the British and the Polish-led divisions. NATO and the Arabs never joined the coalition. NATO participation would have required the approval of France and Germany, both of whom were deeply involved in violating the Iraqi sanctions as well as profiting from the UN's Oil for Food program. Could the administration have foreseen this? Only time will tell.

At present, it appears that the US was caught by surprise by the foreign deception. If this is true, it wouldn't be surprising to find that the administration fully expected NATO to participate, despite the French intransigence at the UN. (Don't forget, all this planning took place before the vote at the UN and the discovery that the French and Germans would not support the invasion.) After all, it would have been a peace-keeping operation, something NATO has done before and continues to do in Bosnia and Kosovo. Without the knowledge of French and German perfidy (as well as the Russians) the administration could perhaps be excused for being taken by surprise.

This is not true of the Arab troops. I find it surprising that the planners would have thought they could have counted on the Arab nations to assist in peacekeeping duties. Considering the minefield of difficulties trying to get Sunni and Shiite Arabs to leave in peace and harmony, one wonders how any Arab nation could keep the peace in another Arab nation. Had the administration done the work beforehand to ensure the Arab nations would be involved? Did the Arabs subsequently renege on their committment? These are questions that beg for answers, but the sensitivity of these issues may mean that we won't know the truth for years.

The writers spend some time quoting various "unnamed officials" attempting to make the case that the administration didn't plan well. These judgments are easy to make after the fact. Hindsight, as they say, is 20-20. Examined in the harsh light of reality, however, many of the complaints are based upon knowledge of events that may not have been foreseeable. To understand this, you need to understand what the administration thought would happen.

In August 2002, leading administration officials circulated a top-secret document blandly titled, "Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy." Months of wrangling at the United Nations were still ahead, but senior officials were drafting the principles that would guide the invasion if the president gave the order to strike.

The goals for Iraq were far-reaching. The aim was not just to topple a dictator, but also to build a democratic system. The United States would preserve, but reform, the bureaucracies that did the day-to-day work of running the country. There were some unstated objectives as well. Policy makers hoped that installing a pro-American government would put pressure on Syria to stop supporting terrorist groups and Iran to halt its nuclear weapons program.

But grand goals did not mean huge forces. From the start, the Pentagon's plan to invade Iraq was a striking contrast to the doctrine for using military power that was developed by Colin L. Powell when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Instead of assembling a giant invasion force over six months, as he did in the Persian Gulf war in 1991, the administration intended to attack with a much smaller force as reinforcements were still streaming to the Middle East.

It isn't my intent to get into a policy discussion about Rumsfield's views of force issues versus the "old school" military thinking. I will leave that issue to military thinkers like Wretchard. All I will say here is that I agree in principle with Rumsfield's thinking. Wars of the future will be asymmetrical in nature and will require rapid response, highly mobile forces. Tanks and other heavy equipment will play less of a role with the exception of major battles.

As you can see, the success of the plan depended upon two things that did not occur; the participation of troops from NATO and the Arab nations, and the existence of the Iraqi bureaucracies. When the former failed to appear, the US had to adjust by keeping troops in Iraq that had originally been slated to leave. When the bureaucracies collapsed, there was no replacement available. In my opinion, the latter is much more to blame for the problems in Iraq than the former. Had the Iraqi bureaucrats remained at their stations, much could have been accomplished that wasn't, including the prevention (or at least curtailment) of the much-discussed looting. Without a police force in place, lawlessness became the norm. Whether or not the administration could have foreseen that is an open question.