Preliminary observations on the 9/11 Commission Report, Executive Summary

The transition to the new Bush administration in late 2000 and early 2001 took place with the Cole issue still pending. President George W.Bush and his chief advisers accepted that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack on the Cole, but did not like the options available for a response. Bin Ladin’s inference may well have been that attacks, at least at the level of the Cole,were risk free. The Bush administration began developing a new strategy with the stated goal of eliminating the al Qaeda threat within three to five years.

During the hearings, the phrase "tired of swatting at flies" was attributed to President Bush. This is, apparently, confirmation of this thinking. Instead of continuing the status quo, Bush wanted a plan to "eliminate" al Qaeda.

This flies directly in the face of the claims of Richard Clarke that the administration wasn't "focused" on Al Qaeda or the claims of others that the problem wasn't "on their radar screen". They clearly wanted to step up the tempo and take the fight to the enemy.

While the United States continued disruption efforts around the world, its emerging strategy to eliminate the al Qaeda threat was to include an enlarged covert action program in Afghanistan, as well as diplomatic strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The process culminated during the summer of 2001 in a draft presidential directive and arguments about the Predator aircraft, which was soon to be deployed with a missile of its own, so that it might be used to attempt to kill Bin Ladin or his chief lieutenants. At a September 4 meeting, President Bush’s chief advisers approved the draft directive of the strategy and endorsed the concept of arming the Predator. This directive on the al Qaeda strategy was awaiting President Bush’s signature on September 11,2001.

This is the "new strategy" mentioned earlier. The Bush administration was about to get very serious about al Qaeda. Unfortunately, al Qaeda completed their plans before Bush approved his.

As final preparations were under way during the summer of 2001, dissent emerged among al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan over whether to proceed. The Taliban’s chief, Mullah Omar, opposed attacking the United States. Although facing opposition from many of his senior lieutenants, Bin Ladin effectively overruled their objections, and the attacks went forward.

The first thing I thought of when I read this was the famous story of the (apocryphal) words of Admiral Yamamoto that he feared Japan had awakened "a sleeping giant". I wonder if Bin Laden already regrets not listening to his senior lieutenants, who were opposed to this operation? I wonder how long Al Qaeda could have gone on killing Americans with impunity had 9/11 not happened? I wonder if Sadaam would still be in power and the US would still be petitioning the UN to act, if 9/11 had not happened? Isn't it always the fate of psychotic leaders to overreach and underestimate their enemy?

The most important failure was one of imagination. We do not believe leaders understood the gravity of the threat. The terrorist danger from Bin Ladin and al Qaeda was not a major topic for policy debate among the public, the media, or in the Congress. Indeed, it barely came up during the 2000 presidential campaign.

I certainly never imagined that hijackers would crash planes into buildings in an attempt to kill as many people as possible. Did you? Did anyone? Yet the Bush administration has been criticized for not doing that.

Terrorism was not the overriding national security concern for the U.S. government under either the Clinton or the pre-9/11 Bush administration. The policy challenges were linked to this failure of imagination. Officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations regarded a full U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as practically inconceivable before 9/11.

I'm pleased to see this conclusion. As much as I have criticized the Clinton administration for not acting sooner or with more ferocity, I think their options, politically, were limited. The American public, at that time, never would have stood for the actions that we so willingly approved after 9/11. (Truth be told, I thought we should have bombed the hell out of Hezbollah when the Marine barracks in Lebanon was bombed and we lost 240+ men.)

There were also broader management issues with respect to how top leaders set priorities and allocated resources. For instance, on December 4, 1998, DCI Tenet issued a directive to several CIA officials and the DDCI for Community Management, stating:“We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community. ”The memorandum had little overall effect on mobilizing the CIA or the intelligence community. This episode indicates the limitations of the DCI’s authority over the direction of the intelligence community, including agencies within the Department of Defense.

That is a startling admission! CIA Director George Tenet, who just just fell on his sword for the cause, clearly saw the danger. Yet, even being the Director, he didn't have the ability to mobilize resources for something he clearly stated the CIA should "spare [no resources or people] in this effort"! My God! This is an incredible indictment of the upper management of the CIA! Clearly there needs to be a major shakeup if we are to have any sort of agility to respond to future threats. Or perhaps we simply need to scrap the entire organization and create a new agency with clearly defined responsibilities?

More to follow........